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CIVIL RIGHTS AND STATE NON-ACTION
Roger Paul Peters*
Introduction
The failure of the states, taken as a whole, to insure and protect the
civil rights1 of everyone equally, from the earliest days to the present, is an
accepted fact. Perhaps the pattern was established by the State of Virginia
during the days of the Articles of Confederation. After enacting an, elaborate
Bill of Rights, this state proceeded to 1) suspend sitting of the courts, 2)
twice appoint a dictator, 3) limit the right to vote otherwise than as provided,
4) enact ex post facto legislation, 5) attaint a man of high treason, and
6) declare a man's life forfeited without trial.2
More recently, governors of certain states, meeting the particular civil-
rights problem of integration, have asserted that there is no higher law than
that established by the "majority" (a numerical majority or a numerical
minority with a majority of the power?). If the majority want to deny the
civil rights of a minority, it is the duty of the governor, by their definition, to
effectuate this desire, as if it were the supreme law of the land. Such an
approach contradicts a basic principle of our form of government, that there
exists a law slightly higher than the desires of the majority. This approach in
the states is not new. Concerning the state governments under the Articles of
Confederation, Madison concluded: "(M]easures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."'3
* Professor of Constitutional Law, Notre Dame Law School, LL.B. New York University.
Member of the New York and United States Supreme Court Bars.
I It is not the purpose herein to define the civil rights of the individual. An interesting list is
contained in the Convention of North Carolina, Declaration of Rights (1788), Tam FnEDwiAsr 646
(Ford ed. 1898).
2 THE FEa ,AsLis No. 10, at 55 (Ford ed. 1898) (Madison). Activities such as these led
Madison to conclude that the operation of state governments under the Articles of Confereration was
responsible "for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and in-
treasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights. . ." Id. at 55-56.
3 Id. at 55.
(303)
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In comparison with the federal government, the states, again taken as a
whole, are more susceptible to corruption on all levels, more likely to heed the
wishes of the majority in disregard of law, less able to enforce their laws,
and less able to rise above self-interest. We have for a long time by-passed the
state governments in favor of the federal government for reasons just such
as these. The adoption of the Constitution was such a by-passing. Similarly,
and more recently, we have the Mann Act,4 the Lindbergh Kidnapping Act,5
and the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Vehicles Act,6 as examples of a
turning to the federal government because of the state's failure to provide
desired results. Furthermore, today the federal government rather than the
state government is expected to control overlords of organized crime.
These by-passings of the states in favor of the federal government
establish a pattern which is perhaps descriptive of what the relationship
between the state and federal governments should be. If the end to be
achieved by government is within the capabilities of the states, responsibility
for achieving that end should remain with them. But when a state fails or
refuses to fulfill this responsibility, it devolves upon the federal government
either to force the state to fulfill its responsibility or to achieve the particular
end itself.
That the securing of civil rights is an end to be achieved by govern-
ment, was early recognized in the Declaration of Independence. It is within
the capabilities of the states to achieve this end, but if a state fails or refuses
to fulfill this responsiblity, it devolves upon the federal government to either
force the state to secure the civil rights of the individual or to secure these
rights itself. Only by such a system as this would the civil rights of an in-
dividual be completely secured as far as possible under our system of gov-
ernment.
Congressional civil rights legislation of some sort is a certainty. The
continuous failure of the states to secure the civil rights of individuals will
eventually result in a complete turning to the federal government for a solu-
tion. This immediately raises serious constitutional problems if Congress is to
produce an effective solution. Do Barron v. Balitmore, the Slaughter-House
Cases,8 and the Civil Rights Cases correctly define the basic limitations of
congressional action, or does our Constitution establish the type of system
described previously? These are the questions to be explored in this article.
I. BARRON v. BALTIMORE
Legal protection - the maintenance of a certain degree of order in the
community - was enjoyed by inhabitants of the thirteen colonies that
became the original United States of America. Dissatisfaction with oppressive
measures on the part of the legally constituted authorities, with King and
4 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1952).
6 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1952).
7 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 153 (1833).
8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
9 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Parliament at the summit, led to the demand for independence, the successful
Revolution, the establishment of the United States, and the more perfect
union of 1787-89. Having won freedom from tyranny, the people of the new
nation were determined not to suffer the new national government to develop
into an instrument'for curtailing dearly bought liberty. To that end, a Bill of
Rights was adopted almost contemporaneously with the new Constitution. It
seems to have been the general belief at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights that such safeguards were necessary primarily as a warning to, or
a restraint on, Congress and the national government with little, if any,
concern being felt about the necessity or desirability of having similar
restraints expressed in the national Constitution with respect to the state
governments. There appears to have been a pervading sentiment that the
people of each state could readily see to it that the government of the states
be kept in check. Such protection for the inhabitants of each state against
their local government as was felt to be necessary had already been provided
for in Article I, section 10 of the Constitution. These are the provisions pro-
hibiting ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, and forbidding duties on imports and exports.
Such in brief is the orthodox view of the position of constitutional
guarantees of fundamental human rights. This view received the approval of
the Supreme Court in 1833 when Barron v. Baltimore'0 was decided. The
Court held that action by a municipality was not governed by that provision
of the fifth amendment which forbids the taking of property for public use
without just compensation. The great Chief Justice, speaking for the Court,
stated that the first eight amendments, the Bill of Rights we hear so much
about, do not apply to the States or their instrumentalities. The Court has
never departed from this view. No matter how often the Court has revised
and even overruled previous doctrines and decisions this marvelous holding
has ever remained a fixed star in the constitutional firmament. The soundness
of the holding on the basis of reason and authority has been widely accepted.
Reason in this connection embraces traditional political theories concerning
the role of the states in the Union as well as construction of the language of
the Constitution, particularly Article I, section 10, which expressly refers
to the states, and the first eight amendments which do not. Authority em-
braces a history of the adoption of the amendments. Yet doubts about the
soundness of Barron v. Baltimore persist." Even at this late date the holding
seems incredible to many until they are shown the report of the case. To the
vast majority of Americans the holding is unknown. After having had the
eulogies of the Bill of Rights dinned in their ears by orators, pundits, lawyers,
bar association committees, and the like, they would be amazed to discover
that this wonderful Bill of Rights does not apply to their state governments.
The people of Alaska have been lately celebrating their great good
fortune in having been admitted as a state of the Union. Henceforth, the
voter in Alaska or Hawaii (presumably soon to be admitted) can vote for
10 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 153 (1833).
11 2 CROSSKEY, POLrTCS AND THE CONSirruTON 1056-82 (1953).
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senators and representatives, he can vote for a governor and for the presi-
dential electors. Politicians throughout the United States will now have to
take Alaskans and Hawaiians into account in their calculations about meas-
ures in Congress as well as about presidential elections. Alaska and Hawaii
will be guaranteed a republican form of government. Their legislatures will
be restrained by Article I, section 10 of the Constitution. All sorts of benefits
will accrue - but no longer will their legislatures be restrained by the Bill
of Rights in the United States Constitution. If Alaskans and Hawaiians want
a Bill of Rights, they will have to do what state citizens before them have
done - see to it that there is a Bill of Rights in the state constitution and get
it observed if they can.
Our American Bill of Rights was adopted long before the parliamentary
reform of 1832 in England when rotten boroughs were abolished. The gerry-
mander, however, appeared early in our history and conditions in some of our
states today approach the rotten borough system of abuses. Georgia is most
notorious in this respect.1" The up-state and down-state inequities in New
York and Illinois are well known. The failure of Indiana to redistrict by its
own legislature, in contemptuous disregard of the state constitution, has re-
cently been brought to public notice.
Contrary to the expectations of the old Jeffersonians, representatives
from rural areas have tended in recent times to show little regard for human
rights. Whatever the causes may be, the fact remains that the individual
human being - without regard to his station in life - has discovered again
and again that he is more apt to receive decent equality of treatment from
federal officers than from local functionaries. 18 Local tyrannies are exercised.
Powerful men at the local level find their power ineffective on the broader
national plane.
Barron v. Baltimore ruled that the rights specified in the first eight
amendments are guaranteed only against federal action. The first amendment,
of course, in terms forbids only action by Congress, but the other amendments
are not in terms so limited. The teaching of Barron v. Baltimore is that since
the words "no state shall" or similar words do not appear in the amendments,
protection on the state level is not guaranteed by the amendments. This doc-
trine is a product of strict construction and not one in the interest of freedom
of individual persons. 14 Every man, woman and child in every state with a
12 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). See also Magraw v. Donavan, 163 F. Supp. 184
(D.C. Minn. 1958).
13 Mr. Justice Jackson apparently felt differently.
Courts can protect the innocent against [illegal searches and seizures] only indirectly
and through the medium of excluding evidence. . . . Federal courts have used this
method of enforcement of the [Fourth] Amendment, . . . although many state
courts do not. This inconsistency does not disturb me, for local excesses or invasions
of liberty are more amenable to political correction . . . . [A]ny really dangerous
threat to the general liberties of the people can only come from [the federal]
government]. (Emphasis added.)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
14 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in speaking of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
ton stated: "This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile of niggardly spirit."
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1955). Contrast the language in Ullmann typically
used in referring to federal infringement of individual rights with the language of Mr. Justice
Jackson is note 13, supra, where only state infringement was involved.
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republican form of government is left at the mercy of the governing group
in the state insofar as the Bill of Rights is concerned.
Professor Crosskey has pointed out, to the disgust of the orthodox, that
the Bill of Rights by its terms specifies standards of governmental action and
that the failure to observe them was believed to be a great evil.' 5 It was so
at the time of the adoption of the amendments, probably almost universally.
It is so believed by many today with regard to most of the standards specified
therein. If violations of the standards are grave evils and forbidden to the
national government, why are not violations by local and state governments
equally grave?16 Crosskey points out that the language of the first amendment
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment or religion,"
means what it says and only what it says. Congress may not legislate on this
matter at all, but the states may. The first amendment is clearly addressed to
congressional powers only. The remaining language of the amendment, "or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances," also, Crosskey explains, -clearly
forbids Congress to prohibit the free exercise of religion, but does not forbid
the states to do so. The same can be said about freedom of speech, that is,
Congress may not abridge it, but the states may. And so forth. But, and here
is the matter that is frequently overlooked, Congress is not forbidden to
protect the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances. Indeed, Congress should be able to control
the states in these matters without in any way violating the -Bill of Rights.
Congressional legislation could be held to be authorized by a combination of
the Bill of Rights and the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, section 8
of the Constitution.
It should be noted that Barron v. Balitmore came down in 1833, long
after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, in an era when elements disruptive of
the Union were increasing in virulence. In the succeeding generation 'those
same elements brought on our bitter Civil War. Crosskey indicates several
statements of judges and commentatdrs on the Constitution which make clear
that many believed (as the unlearned today no doubt still believe) that the
Bill of Rights, except the first amendment, applied to the states.17 It is also
worthy of note that a provision guaranteeing trial by jury in criminal cases
is contained in Article I of the Constitution, relating to the judicial powers
of the United States. Why was this guarantee repeated in the Bill of Rights,
Article VI? It can readily be seen that the repetition of this provision might
well be interpreted as having a wider application in the Bill of Rights, namely,
to the states as well as to the federal courts.
15 Madison referred to these rights as the "great rights of mankind to be secured under this
constitution," not simply federal rights. SMrr AND Mu.pwy, LmERTY AND Jusre 81(1958) (Madi.
son's Speech to Congress, June 8, 1789).
16 2 CRossKnY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1056-82.
17 Id. at 1076.
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Recently the futility of further investigation into the matters discussed
in this article has been alluded to by a judicious writer on the right to
counsel."8 It is submitted, that even though little that is new or important is
likely to be discovered by further investigation, it seems salutary to remind
the bar and inform the public that the great pillars of constitutional law dis-
cussed herein are not althogether worthy of unstinted praise and approbation
and may soon be ripe for being distinquished into the constitutional limbo of
Lochner v. New York,19 A llgeyer v. Louisiana,20 the Child Labor Tax Case,2
or even into the pit of oblivion of Plessy v. Ferguson,22 Dred Scott v. San-
ford,23 the great income tax case24 and the like.
IH. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
A discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases2 5 is undertaken here for the
purpose of examining the concept of state action as a limitation on the power
of Congress. In this case, decided in 1872, the Supreme Court was being
called upon for the first time to give judicial construction to the fourteenth
amendment which had been ratified in 1868. The issue before the Court
was whether the legislature of Louisiana had the constitutional power to
create an exclusive franchise in one corporation to maintain the slaughter
house facilities for all butchering in the city of New Orleans. The plaintiffs
objected to such action on the grounds that the sanitation reasons advanced in
justification were a pretense for creating a state-favored monopoly which
would violate the natural rights of butchers to pursue their profession. Such
rights, it was contended, were privileges and immunities of federal citizenship,
which could not now be abridged by state law because of the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment. In a five-four decision, the Court rejected this argu-
ment by holding that privileges and immunities of federal citizenship was a
separate category from privileges and immunities of state citizenship. Each
class encompassed only those rights which were in fundamental relationship
to the modifier "federal" or "state." Pursuit of a profession was within a
citizen's state rights, not federal; therefore, any abridgement of this right by
the state would not be an abridgement of the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship. National citizenship protected things in the nature of
freedom to travel among the states,2 rights to petition the federal government,
protection on the high seas, habeas corpus and other enumerated rights.
The dissents asserteda7 that the privileges and immunities of federal
citizenship was a much broader category, including within it the funda-
18 Rackow, The Right to Counsel - Time for Recognition under the Due Process Clause, 10
W. REs. L. Rnv. 216, n.2 (1959).
19 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
22 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
24 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
25 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
26 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), had been decided prior to the fourteenth
amendment and had struck down a state law attempting to charge travelers for the privilege of
passing through the state because it would interfere with the rights of the federal government.
2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 at 83, 111, 124 (1872).
CIVIL RIGHTS
mental rights of state citizens in their relation to state governments. The right
of a state citizen not to have the state abridge his fundamental rights against
the state was of itself a privilege and immunity of federal citizenship. The
right to follow one's profession freely without the state interference of favor-
itism to special groups was such a right and therefore could not be abridged
by state law.
These, then, were the first views taken of the privileges and immunities
of national citizenship by the Supreme Court. And though the majority view
became firmly established as a fundamental canon from which the vast store
of fourteenth-amendment jurisprudence flows, some persist to question the
validity of the decision, notably Justice Black.28 The case has become
identified with the issue of whether the fourteenth amendment "incorporates"
the first eight amendments, and an examination of the views of Professor Fair-
man against those of Professor Crosskey on this question" gives some idea
of the conflicting theories of history that may be applied in an historical
evaluation of the Slaughter-House decision.
Some of the salient issues with which this controversy is concerned
reveal the tremendous scope and importance of the Slaughter-House de-
cision in our constitutional history. The question of whether the Framers of
the first eight amendments originally intended that the rights contained in
these amendments should be protected against infringement by only the
national government and not the states is the beginning of the controversy. To
Fairman, the decision in Barron v. Baltimore enunciates the true constitutional
will of the people. Consequently, the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment is to be interpreted in this light. Crosskey, on the other hand,
concludes that the decision in Barron v. Baltimore was incorrect. He further
concludes that the most obvious intent shown in the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment was an intent to do away with Barron v. Baltimore.
In light of these two interpretations of history, it is relatively simple, then,
to see the two opposing definitions that could be given to the privileges and
immunities clause. The words of the original draftsman speaking of the
fourteenth amendment have this to say:
[T]he proposed amendment does not impose upon any state of the
Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which
is not now enjoined upon them by the letter of the Constitution.3 0
Allowing Fairman to project his own psychological satisfaction with the
prior constitutional history into this speaker, the resulting statement says the
fourteenth amendment is a truism, as the court did indeed interpret it. Allow-
ing Crosskey to interject his disatisfaction, the statement becomes an obvious
attempt to overthrow Barron v. Baltimore.
28 See dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947), and more recently, citing that
dissent, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
29 Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. Rav.
5 (1949); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1954); and Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22
U. CHr. L. REv. 144 (1954).
30 CoaN. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1865-66).
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The period subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
by Congress again provides the battleground for their opposing inferences.
Fairman asserts that the failure of states to consider that many of their pro-
cedures were then in conflict with the first eight amendments, and the failure
of lawyers to assert such arguments in court,31 are clear indications that
the clause was not intended to have such a broad effect, whereas Crosskey
discounts these instances as oversights of negligible importance when balanced
against the view expressed by the contemporary Congress in its passage of the
civil rights legislation.
Fairman has on his side the tremendous weight of judicial history sub-
sequent to the Slaughter-House Cases, which has always re-affirmed its hold-
ing, while Crosskey's position finds its strength in the inference that the
privileges and immunities clause, if the heart of the fourteenth amendment,
certainly was intended to have a greater effect than the cipher to which it was
reduced. The controversy here outlined, however, takes place wholly within
the area of what is protected against positive state action, since the clause
is prefaced "No state shall make or enforce any law. .. ." Part of the question
becomes moot since the subsequent enlargement of the due process clause
to include "fundamental personal rights and liberties"3 2 has resulted in the
inclusion of much of what the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases would
include as things "which of right belong to citizens of all free governments"'3
in the privileges and immunities clause.
As to the concept of state action, however, the Slaughter-House Cases
remain relevant in two respects: 1) Insofar as it made the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment bear the burden of
what was intended to be covered by the privileges and immunities clause, the
decision destroyed any vitality the equal protection clause might have had
by contrast with a "proper" interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause. 2) This decision implied some basic assumptions that were later to
become dogmatic in the subsequent cases defining the limitations of con-'
gressional power over civil rights.
Relevant to the second point are the statements by Mr. Justice Miller
in the Slaughter-House Cases implying that any other interpretation of the
privileges and immunities than his interpretation, would grant Congress
complete control over state legislation. Thus, he asks:
[Wias it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire
domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?
All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plain-
tiffs in error be sound. For not only are these rights subject to the
control of Congress whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed
to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in
advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the
31 See note 95 infra.
32 "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . .
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
33 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97.
CIVIL RIGHTS
States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment
it may think proper on all such subjects. And still further, such a
construction .... would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon
all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens,
with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with
those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
amendment.... But when, as in the case before us, these consequences
are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading,, so great a departure
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to
fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character;
... the argument [that such was not the intent] has a force that is
irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose
too clearly to admit of doubt.3 4
It would seem that Mr. Justice Miller's argument, and that of Mr.
Fairman, are founded in reasoning that because the privileges and immunities
clause was poorly drafted to allow for two extremely divergent views as to
its meaning, the Court should choose that interpretation most consistent
with the existing state-federal structure. However, if we examine the results
of subsequent judicial history under the fourteenth amendment and observe
the great supervisory power of the Supreme Court that has subsequently
developed over state legislatures through the medium of due process, and if
we assume further that such was the intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment, then the intent we discover in retrospect today is certainly at
odds with much of what Mr. Justice Miller concluded could not be the intent
without further clarity.
First, his assumption that if a broad meaning were given to the privileges
and immunities dlause, the Supreme Court would then have the "authority
to nullify such [state legislation] as it did not approve as consistent with those
rights as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment ' 3 5 is
spurious in its import that as a result, a natural law-laissez faire system of
rights would be frozen into the Constitution under which state legislatures
could make no new laws nor change old ones.36 For in reflecting on the Su-
preme Court's ability to collapse generalities under the force of social
pressures,3 7 the privileges and immunities "in their nature, fundamental;
which belong of right to citizens of all free governments"38 could have been
made to give way before the future surge of social legislation just as easily
as "the fundamental rights and liberties protected by the due process clause."3 9
Secondly, Mr. Justice Miller's repugnance to the general idea of the
Supreme Court as a "perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states" has
not proved to be an inherited characteristic of his judicial descendants in
34 Id. at 77-78.
35 Id. at 78.
36 See FAMIuAN, M. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT,' 1862-1890, at 180-81 (1939),
setting forth opposing counsels' views on the affect of a broad interpretation of privileges and im-
munities.
37 E.g., Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), holding that a mortgage
moratorium law did not impair the obligation of contracts.
8 Corfield v. Coryell, 6,Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (No. 3,230) (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823).
39 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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terms of the power they have seen fit to wield over state legislation, except
when judicial humility prompts them to refrain from scrutinizing too closely.
Thirdly, his concept of what is within the state legislative power "in
their most ordinary and usual functions" as against the scope of the federal
legislative power, has undergone a tremendous displacement of power through
other clauses of the constitution, most notably taxation4" and commerce,4
bringing with it new concepts of concurrent state-federal legislative jurisdic-
tion unknown in 1872.42
If we were allowed to give Mr. Justice Miller an insight retrospectively
into what the dormant "intent" of the whole Constitution would come to mean
as to the proper balance between state and federal power, would he be
equally as willing today to say in affirming his argument for a narrow con-
struction of privileges and immunities that:
The argument we admit is not always the most conclusive which is
drawn from consequences urged against the adoption of a particular
construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these
consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and'pervading, so great
a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; ... when
in fact [the effect] radically changes the whole theory of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence
of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of
doubt.
43
Such an analysis may be an argument for, or an argument against, or no
argument at all that the Slaughter-House Cases were wrong in their inception
since it is a dubious method of constitutional jurisprudence to reconstruct
the framers' intent in history by imputing to them knowledge of what later
courts would declare the whole intent of the Constitution to have been. But
it is significant insofar as Mr. Justice Miller did not refer to the legislative
history of the fourteenth amendment to find this intention but relied squarely
upon his interpretation of what the federal-state structure was in making a
choice between two definitions. For the resulting definition of privileges and
immunities based upon the state-federal structure, should then be subject to
as much change as the state-federal relationship has undergone. The anomaly
remains, that in construing the Constitution as a living, organic whole, the
privileges and immunities clause has been discarded as lifeless, when in
reality, even without saying Slaughter-House was wrong, there should be
principles of life remaining which are as yet undeveloped.
44
40 E.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937) (sustaining the Social Security Act of 1935).
41 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining the Agricutural Adjustment Act).
42 E.g., Compare United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), with
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), where after the Court held the business of in-
surance to be interstate commerce, Congress successfully ceded its power to the states.
43 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
44 In this connection, it is interesting to note the comment of Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. llnv. 1323, 1346-47 (1952), concerning the possible applica-
tion of § 241 of the Civil Rights Act (making it a crime to interfere with a citizen's exercise of
his privileges and immunities) to interference with rights created under various pieces of federal
legislation. See KoNvnz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVmL RIoHTs 44-45 (1947).
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The fact that the state-federal structure has changed and grown in com-
plexity is also directly relevant to the concept of state action that the Slaughter-
House Cases engendered. First of all, the contentions in the case represented
two polar extremes, with no indication being made that there was in fact a
great middle ground of decision both as to the Supreme Court's power of
review and the legislative power of Congress. For instance, none of the
justices saw fit to hold that the right to pursue one's profession without un-
reasonable interference from the state was a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship but that in this particular case, there was no abridgement because
the legislation was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Yet today under substantive
due process, the right is recognized even though the legislation is upheld. 5
There was an assumption by the majority, implied by its projection of the
consequences that must necessarily flow from a broad interpretation of
privileges and immunities that future Supreme Courts would be unable to
make evaluative distinctions as to what was and what was not fundamental
between the citizen and his state government. This assumption, as we have
seen befpre, has been proved inaccurate as to the power of the Court by the
subsequent development of substantive due process and the greater protection
of civil as opposed to economic liberties.
But there was also an assumption that as to the legislative power of
Congress in the enforcement clause, the necessary result of broad privileges
and immunities would be complete control of state legislatures in all respects.
Again, the assumption failed to recognize that future Supreme Courts would
have the ability and the duty to draw the line on Congress between what
was fundamental to the spirit of the fourteenth amendment in the concept
of civil rights as against the large area of legislative subject matter which
could properly remain indifferent to that spirit and therefore be left a matter
of local concern. Why should "privileges and immunities of national citizen-
ship" be any less subject to progressive evaluative definition than "due
process of law"? The conclusion of the majority that it should not be capable
of such interpretation denied the ability of the Supreme Court to use its own
common sense to avoid those same consequences which were thought to be so
"serious, far-reaching and pervading" as to call for no other conclusion than
that it had just made.
In this context, the attempts at civil rights legislation by Congress were
to fight for their existence and find their annihilation. The assumptions had
been laid. All that was necessary now was to follow them out. Privileges and
immunities of national citizenship did not include any relationships of the
individual to his state government because this would allow complete con-
gressional power over all things ordinarily subject to state legislative power.
Acts of individuals against other individuals are ordinarily subject to state
legislation and, therefore, they could not be subject matter of federal
legislation. Without recognizing that Congress had itself made the evaluative
distinction as to the actual constitutional limits of its power in state legislative
45 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
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areas, the Supreme Court blindly followed the assumptions of the Slaughter-
House decision into the abyss of the Civil Rights Cases.
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
In a series of cases 46 culminating with the Civil Rights Cases,4" the
Supreme Court of the United States frustrated in large measure the intention
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment to provide the federal govern-
ment with legislative power extending to private interference with civil
rights.4" This was accomplished by the concept "state action," or more pre-
cisely, "positive state action."4 9 Simply stated, state action includes state
legislation and the acts of state officials and quasi-officials done under color
of state law. 50
State action proved from the beginning to be a difficult concept to apply,
and the courts have been continually called upon to define its limits. Their
efforts, particularly of late, have resulted in charges that they are disin-
tegrating the strict and conventional interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment.51
At the present time state action stands as a barrier to effective judicial
interpretation and effective legislative implementation of the fourteenth
amendment because it prevents both Congress and the federal courts from
reaching individual action when, in their judgment, the situation might other-
wise warrant such extension of the federal power. Such a situation exists when
private individuals interfere with civil rights and the states choose to "sit on
their hands" and permit such interference.
The present situation in one limited area of civil rights - school
desegregation - illustrates the effect of the concept, of state action on the
United States Congress. Five years have elapsed since the Supreme Court
declared school segregation on the basis of race unconstitutional, 52 and as
46 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. (10
Otto) 313 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1879); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. (16 Otto) 629 (1882).
47 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
48 Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1323, 1339-40
(1952). That this was the intent of the framers, see FLACK, THE ADOIMON OF THE FouRTEENTH
AMENDMENT 262-63, 277 (1908); Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights, 46
CoLuM. L. REv. 94, 105 (1946); Barnett, What is "State" Action under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution? 24 ORE. L. REV. 227-28 232 (1945); Frank & Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLuM. L. RaV. 131, 163-64
(1950). The vast majority of the witnesses before the congressional committee which framed the
fourteenth amendment complained of private and not state action. KENDRIcK, Tim JOuRNAL OF THE
JoINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 267-68(1914).
49 Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
CORNELL L. Q. 375-76 (1958).
50 Id. at 375. See generally State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956).
51 Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, 27 FolwAlm L. Rxv. 187
(1958). See also Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Note, The Disintegration of a Concept--State Action
Under the 14th and 15th Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 402 (1948). The courts, however, have
a defender. Manning, State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment; An Adherence to
Tradition, 27 FoamisM L. REV. 201 (1958).
52 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
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yet Congress has enacted no legislation which would assist the courts in en-
forcing this decree. However,
We sense, indeed, a crying need for the flexibility of the political
process as distinguished from the relative rigidity of the judicial process,
and we can deplore the fact that Supreme Court in the Civil Rights
Cases of 1883 relieved the congressional conscience by freeing it of
major responsibility. Perhaps more relevant to the public need at the
time of the Brown decision would have been the overruling of the Civil
Rights decision rather than of Plessy v. Ferguson with its "separate
but equal" doctrine.- But the Supreme Court of today has no means
of overruling the Civil Rights decision unless Congress goes in the face
of that decision and enacts a statute in violation of it. This, we currently
see, Congress is most reluctant to do.
53
Thus as the federal judiciary continues to go it alone in the area of school
desegregation it is paying for the "sin" of their predecessors over fifty years
ago - the Civil Rights Cases.
The Civil Rights label itself raises a major problem of definition -
what are civil rights? Which rights should be protected by government? Yet
rather than being concerned with this problem, the United States is still pre-
occupied with the lesser problem of devising a system commensurate with
federalism which will effectively protect that which is predetermined a civil
right of an individual. If such a system were established by the fourteenth
amendment, and the Supreme Court had been willing to recognize it, the
United States could have proceeded to the definitional problem involved in
civil rights. But by not recognizing the system established in the fourteenth
amendment for federal protection of civil rights, our dual sovereignty form
of government, which should provide a double guarantee of civil rights to
the individual, has been permitted to become itself an instrument for the
denial of civil rights.
Effective protection of civil rights occurs when a forum exists in which
interference with a civil right either by the state or an individual is rectified.
This may be illustrated as follows. Assuming freedom of speech to be a civil
right, if John Doe rents a hall and announces that he is going to give a speech
on the evils of smoking, and another individual who happens to be a cigarette
salesman informs him that if he gives this speech he will suffercertain eco-
nomic and physical injuries, there has been an interference with John Doe's
freedom of speech. (There may also be an interference with his right to be
free from threats of violence, but this is a right distinct from his right of
freedom of speech and his remedy for one is not necessarily the remedy for
the other.) John Doe's right of freedom of speech is effectively protected if
the state 1) provides laws which make it a crime and/or a tort for one person
to interfere with another's freedom of speech and 2) actually administers,
enforces, and construes these laws so that the individual who interfered with
John Doe's civil right is convicted of a crime and/or assessed with damages,
subject of course to the vicissitudes of the judicial process. The failure of a
state to provide an effective remedy to rectify an interference with the civil
53 SWIsHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 160 (1958).
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rights of an individual is termed, in the context of this article, state non-ac-
tion. 4
By reason of the Civil Rights Cases Congress is powerless under the
fourteenth amendment in the face of state non-action. Congress cannot
order the state legislature to enact laws which provide remedies for inter-
ference with civil rights. Thus, when a state has provided no effective remedy,
Congress must deal directly with offenders and offenses, but this the Civil
Right Cases taught us Congress may not do. In the context of our illustration
above, if the state has not provided John Doe with a remedy against the
individual who interferes with his right of freedom of speech, Congress is
precluded from declaring such interference a crime or a tort and providing
for adjudication in a federal court.
Because the Civil Rights Cases prevent Congress from overcoming the
effects of state non-action, this decision will be put to close scrutiny in an
effort to determine the soundness of the Court's reasoning and assumptions.
Then, the theory of state non-action will be more fully developed in an effort
to determine what congressional legislation today would be "appropriate
legislation" under the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States must of necessity take into con-
sideration things other than what are normally termed judicial precedents.
As precedents, decisions founded in policy are frequently the most unsound
precedents of the Court because they remain in existence long after the
considerations of policy upon which they were based are proved invalid or
cease to exist. The Civil Rights Cases was a policy decision, as a reading of
the decision will demonstrate. At the end of the rather long and repetitious
opinion, Justice Bradley wrote:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes
the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 55
This strange platitude indicates that the decision was merely a "judicial
ratification of the conviction widely held among white people that enough
time had been spent in getting protection for the former slaves and that they
must find some way of getting along without special attention. '56
Time has proven the invalidity of the Court's policy determination that
the Negroes as a race were ready to fend for themselves. However, the fiction
of this determination even at the time it was made can be readily seen by con-
trasting Justice Bradley's statement above with one made by Justice Strong
54 A distinction will be made here between state non-action and state inaction. State inaction is
the failure of officials of the executive and judicial branches of the state government to act in a
particular situation for the protection of the rights of an individual when under a duty to act under
existing state laws. State non-action will refer to the failure of the state legislatures to enact legisla-
tion to provide effective remedies against individuals' interference with civil rights.
55 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
56 SwisHmt, op. cit. supra note 53, at 152.
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less than three years earlier. In Strauder v. West Virginia57 Justice Strong
wrote:
At the time when [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments] were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little
knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long
been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and
positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to
perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations
against them had been habitual. It was well known that, in some States,
laws making such discriminations then existed, and others might well
be expected. The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant,
and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those
who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere
children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise govern-
ment extends to those who are unable to protect themselves.58
Thus in the fifteen years which had elasped since the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment, and the less than three years since Justice Strong
wrote his opinion in Strauder, the "abject and ignorant" colored race whose
"training had left them mere children" had closed the gap between themselves
and the "superior intelligence" of the white race despite the fact that continued
efforts had been made during this period "to perpetuate the distinction that
had before existed." Therefore, "the protection which a wise government
extends to those who are unable to protect themselves" was no longer needed.
By "repealing" most of the existing civil rights legislation, a short time
before its probable repeal by Democratic majorities in Congress, the Court
returned the protection of the civil rights of the Negro race and all future
minority groups to the "ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected." 59 The Court, speaking through Justice Bradley, had something to
say about these "ordinary modes" of protection also.
In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as
are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be
impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive pro-
ceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an
invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect
his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some
way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain
in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of
the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to
vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a
witness or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoy-
ment of the right in a particular case; he may commit an assualt against
the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the polls or
slander the good name of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in
these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he
cannot destroy or injure the right. He will only render himself amen-
57 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880).
58 Id. at 306.
59 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). .
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able to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable therefore to the
laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed.
Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States as far
as we are aware, are bound to the extent of their facilities, to furnish
proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good
faith apply for them.60 (Emphasis added.)
The above quotation illustrates a fictional presumption the Court is
too often wont to make - the sufficiency of state processes.6 ' This is a de-
termination that is properly made by Congress after long and careful investi-
gation of not only whether laws exist, but also whether they are enforced.
Justice Bradley presumed that any interference by one individual with the
civil rights of another in any state in the union may "be vindicated by resort
to the laws of the State for redress." He further presumed that a person
who interferes with the civil rights of another, no matter in which state such
interference occurs, is simply "amenable to satisfaction or punishment . . .
[under] ... the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed." No
indication is made to show that every state had civil rights legislation (which
they did not), 6 to say nothing of the question of enforcing ordinary
criminal and tort actions. Justice Bradley assumed that the objective of the
congressional enactment being struck down - equal facilities in inns and
public conveyances for people of all races - was being accomplished "by
the laws of all the States as far as [members of the Court] are aware." Again,
there was no indication of the extent of the "awareness" of the Court.
It is unnecessary to demonstrate the invalidity both in 1883 and today of
these presumptions indulged in by Justice Bradley. Congress undoubtedly de-
termined in 1875 that individuals were being denied equal facilities in
restaurants, inns, and public conveyances, and that such denials were not
being rectified by state processes. Presuming as correct all the Court's as-
sumptions as to the sufficiency of state processes in 1883 to accomplish the
objective of the law in question, they would only be grounds for congressional
repeal of the law, rather than for the Court's determination that Congress did
not have the power of enactment.
Thus far we have seen two presumptive fictions used by the Court in
the Civil Rights Cases - the readiness of the Negro race to fend for itself
and the sufficiency of state processes to protect civil rights. But these two as-
sumptions are most likely only excuses for the Court's narrow construction
of the fourteenth amendment, rather than the basis for that construction.
Narrow construction of the Constitution when the power of Congress is con-
cerned and broad construction when the power of the Court is concerned is
60 Id. at 17, 25.
61 E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts).
62 Between 1865 and 1883 there was comparatively little legislation in the Northern, Eastern and
Western states as to civil rights. Massachusetts, Delaware, Kansas, Montana, and New York were
the only states outside of the South having any civil rights legislation in 1883. Such legislation could
be found in the South at this time only in Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Florida and North Caro-
lina. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 547, 555-63 (1909). See
SWisHER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 148-62.
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an almost traditional aspect of our jurisprudence. 5 This, coupled with the
general feeling of dissatisfaction with the congressional role in the Reconstruc-
tion, is probably the real basis for the decision of the majority. In view of
congressional excesses during Reconstruction, the Court's interest in curtailing
rather than extending the power of Congress is understandable. But by be-
latedly locking the barn in 1883, the Court denied the power to all succeed-
ing Congresses and effectively removed civil rights from the political process.
Thus, the changing sentiment of the people in regard to civil rights has found
only limited expression through the courts. Correctly used, the power the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to confer upon Congress would
have allowed for full expression of these sentiments as well as have provided
the flexibility needed to meet changing situations.64 The error of the Court's
action in denying a power to Congress because of a past abuse of power
might be readily conceded by the present Court when it reflects that the
same sort of reasoning is being used by those who urge curbing the Court
because of more recently alleged abuses.
But returning from the area of policy, the incorrectness of the considera-
tions underlying the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases means nothing
if the Court nevertheless correctly construed the language of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court dismissed the first sentence of the amendment as
merely "declaring who shall be citizens of the United States." Justice Harlan
objected to this eclectic reading of the amendment and found that the first
sentence was positive, granting and creating both state and federal citizenship,
and entitling Congress to insure to everyone all the rights of citizenship.6"
The invalidity of the majority's interpretation of the amendment can be
shown, however, without attempting to settle the dispute with Mr. Justice
Harlan in dissent. Speaking for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice
Bradley wrote:
It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of
the amendment. It has a deeper and a broader scope. It nullifies and
makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which
impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process
of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the
law.66
It is necessary for the reader at this point to have before him an exact
text of the portion of section one of the fourteenth amendment under dis-
cussion and of section five.
Article XIV
Sec. 1.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
63 Compare Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906), with In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). A
notable exception is Congress's power under the commerce clause. After the traditionally narrow con-
struction, United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court ultimately went to the other
extreme, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
64 See SwisHER, op. cit. supra note 53, at 148-60.
65 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 43-52 (1883) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan).
66 Id. at 11.'
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nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. (Emphasis added.)
Justice Bradley, by the statements just quoted, rewrote section one so
that it now reads in effect:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State [make or enforce any law so as to] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor [make or enforce
any law so as to] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
If it is doubted that Justice Bradley read the first section in this manner,
re-examine the excerpt of the opinion quoted above where he said:
It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of
every kind which impairs . . . privileges and immunities, injures . . .
without due process of law, or which denies... equal protection .... 67
If this is what the framers meant they would have anticipated Justice
Bradley and written:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge .... deprive
... , or deny ....
But this they did not do. What they did do was (1) prohibit the states from
abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
designating with positive language (". . . make or enforce . . .") the method
by which abridgment must occur in order to fall within the prohibition; (2)
prohibit the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law, saying nothing about the method by which de-
privation must occur in order to come within the prohibtion; (3) prohibit
the states from denying any person the equal protection of the laws, again
without designating how the prohibited denial must come about.6 s
The obvious question at this point is: May a state deprive a person of
due process of law and deny him the equal protection of the laws other than by
making or enforcing a law? The equally obvious answer is: Yes, by not
making or enforcing a law when under a duty to do so.
IV. STATE NON-ACTION
It is helpful to review briefly the development up to this point. The
validity of the decision which made necessary a fourteenth amendment,
Barron v. Baltimore, was questioned in Section I. In Section II, the Slaughter-
67 Ibid.
68 The complete separation of the second and third clauses from the first clause is obvious to
the casual reader. The last two clauses are set off from the first clause by a semi-colon. The
subject of the first clause ("no State") is repeated but changed ("any State"). The recipient of the
protection in the first clause ("citizens") is changed and the number of recipients is increased ("any
person"). Lastly, while the first clause is limited to those laws which involve privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, the last two clauses extend to all laws no matter what their
subject matter. The second and third clauses express distinct concepts of their own, borrowing nothing
from the first clause, particularly not the words "make and enforce."
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House Cases, the Court's first pronouncement on the fourteenth amendment,
was considered primarily to show that the a priori rejection of broad con-
gressional power in its reasoning set the stage for the decision in the Civil
Rights Cases. This last-mentioned decision was considered in Section III in
order to demonstrate the fragile assumptions of the majority and the consid-
erations of policy which dictated such an extreme denial of congressional
power. As a secondary point, the effect of this decision on the protection of
civil rights in our dual-sovereignty form of government was briefy examined.
In the present section, state non-action, the key to a correct determination of
the extent of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment, will be
first traced in the legislative history of the civil rights laws enacted between
1868-1875. Secondly, state non-action will be examined in light of judicial
developments since the decision in the Civil Rights Cases as well as in the
judicial history prior to this decision. Ultimately, it is hoped that the question
raised by section five of the fourteenth amendment, namely, just what is
"appropriate legislation," will be answered.
A. Legislative History of State Non-Action
The first real efforts to enact laws for the enforcement of the provisions
of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments occurred during the Second
Session of the Forty-First Congress and resulted in the Act of May 31,
1870.9 A bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Edmunds for the
enforcement of the fifteenth amendment, but was amended by Senator Se-
ward for the purpose of enforcing the third section of the fourteenth amend-
ment and for securing to all persons the equal protection of the laws. During
the debates on this bill, Senator Pool of North Carolina surveyed the
problem of state non-action and asserted that Congress had the power to
overcome the non-action of a state by legislating directly against individual
action. Senator Pool defined the word "deny" as used in both the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments as including both acts of omission and com-
mission by the states. According to him, a state was capable of denying civil
rights by omission, that is, by a failure to prevent its own citizens from de-
priving any of their fellow citizens of the rights secured by the amendments,
but the States were now prohibited from such denial. The possibility of denial
by omission gave Congress the power to reach individual action because
Congress had no power to legislate against the states. °
On the 23rd of March, 1871, after the House of Representatives had
determined to adjourn without having passed any bills for the enforcement
of the amendments, a message was received from President Grant recom-
mending that such legislation be enacted. Congressman Shellabarger, who
had been in Congress when the fourteenth amendment was proposed, re-
ported a bill in the House five days later to the special session which had re-
69 16 Stat. 140. This statute re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, 14
Stat. 27, which raised the constitutional questions leading to the proposal of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT 19-40, 94-95 (1908).
70 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611-13 (1870) (Senator Pool, N.C.).
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suited from President Grant's message.71 Section three of the proposed bill
is of particular interest for our purposes because it was aimed directly at
state non-action. This section provided:
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combinations, or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder
the execution of the laws thereof, and of the United States, as to
deprive any portion or class of the people of such State of any of the
rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection named in the Constitu-
tion and secured by this act, and the constituted authorities of such
State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in
or refuse protection of the people in such rights, such facts shall be
deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws to
to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the United
States .... 72
This bill, including the third section, was passed by the House, after nine
days of debate. Of the one hundred eighteen voting for the bill, fifteen had
been members of Congress when the fourteenth amendment was proposed.
Two others who also had been members at that time were absent, but they
were probably in favor of the billT
3
Even more important than the adoption of the bill with a section
aimed directly at state non-action, are the remarks made during the debates
which preceded its adoption. (It must be remembered that this was the
first effort by Congress to enforce primarily the provisions of the first section
of the fourteenth amendment.)
Congressman Hoar of Massachusetts pointed out that it had sometimes
been suggested that the fourteenth amendment was aimed at only unlawful
acts by state authorities. He urged, however, that the equal protection clause
was evidence that this was not the case since it would have been unnecessary
if that were all that had been intended. He then indicated that the refusal
on the part of the state officials to extend the protection provided for by the
first section, for example, if juries as a rule refused to do justice where the
rights of a particular class of citizens were concerned and the state afforded
no remedy, was as much a denial of equal protection of the laws as if the
state had enacted a statute that no verdict should be rendered in favor of
that class of citizens.
74
Representative Garfield, also a member of Congress when the four-
teenth amendment was proposed, maintained that the equal protection of
laws clause was the most valuable clause in section one. He stated that if
state laws were just and equal on their face, but were not enforced either
by reason of the neglect or refusal of state authorities, Congress was em-
powered by the equal protection clause to provide for the doing of justice to
those who were thus denied equal protection of the laws. 75
Congressmen Colburn and Wilson of Indiana held similar views on the
power of Congress to rectify the effects of state non-action. Mr. Colburn,
71 FLACK, op. cit. supra note 69, at 226-28.
72 Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
73 FLACK, op. cit. supra note 69, at 244-45.
74 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871).
75 Id. at app. 149-54.
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in answer to those who were maintaining that Congress had no power until
a state had actually abridged the privileges of citizens, stated that affirmative
action or legislation on the part of the state was not necessary to authorize
congressional action, since the failure of the state to see to it that every one
was protected in his rights was just as flagrant as a positive denial of pro-
tection. 76 Representative Wilson felt that the equal protection clause should
be read as saying in effect that "no State shall fail or refuse to provide for the
equal protection of the laws to all persons within its jurisdiction." According
to him, both the failure of a state to enact proper laws as well as the failure
of a state to enforce existing laws constituted a denial of equal protection.
When such was the case Congress possessed the power to enact laws to secure
equal protection.
77
Congressman Bingham, the man who drafted the second sentence of
section one of the fourteenth amendment, including the equal protection
clause, made a long and significant address during the debate on the bill.78
At one point in his remarks, Representative Bingham stated that under the
Constitution as recently amended, Congress had the power to provide against
the denial of rights by the states whether the states accomplished this denial
by acts of omission or of commission. He said that citizens were being de-
prived of property without compensation, denied trial by jury, restricted
in the freedom of speech and of the press, and that no remedies existed by
which such interference with the rights of citizens could be rectified. 79
While these remarks on the power of Congress to overcome the. effects
of the state non-action were being made in the House, a similar approach
developed in the Senate. On April 4, 1871, Senator Morton of Indiana de-
clared that the last clause of section one made a failure to secure the equal
protection of the laws the same as a denial of equal protection. It was un-
important whether this failure was willful or merely the result of inability.
Senator Morton felt that the last clause read in effect that every person in
the United States shall be entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Because
Congress could enact legislation applicable only to individuals and not the
states directly, this was the only method available to secure equal protection
where it was being denied by a failure of the state to act.80
76 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871).
77 Id. at 481-83.
78 In this speech Representative Bingham carefully explained the meaning of sections one and
five of the fourteenth amendment as understood by himself and the other framers of the
amendment at the time of its proposal. In his conservative statement on the intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Fairman intimates that Congressman Bingham's speech
of 1871 is no evidence of the intent of the framers; and implies that perhaps in 1871, he was at-
tempting to perpetrate a fraud on the country. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rv. 5, 137 (1949). It is difficult to understand why the statements
of the man who drafted all except the first sentence of section one, expressed in Congress during
the first real effort to enact legislation for the enforcement of that section, are not evidence of the
meaning the framers intended the amendment to have while Mr. Fairman's opinions formulated
over ninety years later are evidence of that intent. See also Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative
History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHL L. Rav. 1, 89-91 (1954).
79 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 83-85 (1871). Congressman Bingham expressed
similar views when the first section of the fourteenth amendment was before the House. FLAcK, op.
cit. supra note 69, at 79.
80 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 251 (1871).
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The end result of the debates in Congress during the special session of
the spring of 1871 was the Act of April 20, 1871.81 Portions of this act were
held unconstitutional in United States v. Harris,82 which was one of the de-
cisions leading up to the Civil Rights Cases.
During the debates preceding the enactment of the Act of March 1,
1875,83 the first two sections of which were held unconstitutional in the
Civil Rights Cases, the power of Congress to reach individual action when
faced with state non-action was again recognized. Mr. Lawrence of Ohio, a
member of Congress when the fourteenth amendment was proposed, made
an important address. After quoting the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment, he continued: "The object of this provision is to make all men equal
before the law. If a State permits inequality in rights to be created or meted
out by citizens or corporations enjoying its protection it denies the equal pro-
tection of the laws. What the State permits by its sanction, having the power
to prohibit, it does in effect itself."84 Mr. Lawrence asserted that the word
"deny" included omission as well as commission. To him the state which
failed to enforce or secure equal rights was just as reprehensible as the
state which actively denied those rights, for the failure to secure protection
was in itself a denial. He further declared that the bills, the debates of which
we have just considered, proceeded upon that idea that if a state omitted or
neglected to secure the enforecment of equal rights, it denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 85
It is not asserted that the laws enacted in 1870, 1871 and 1875 to over-
come the effects of state non-action were necessarily appropriate to ac-
complish that end. It is asserted, however, that it was intention of the framers
of the fourteenth amendment that Congress have the power to provide
remedies for interference with civil rights when no remedies exist under state
law. This is readily discernible from the remarks of men who were in Congress
when the fourteenth amendment was proposed, who were instrumental in its
becoming a part of the Constitution, and who even wrote the very words
which conferred this power.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the majority refused to adopt this interpreta-
tion of the framers of the equal protection clause, but Justice Bradley in
writing the opinion could not help but adopt some of the phraseology of this
interpretation.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any authority, is
simply a private wrong . . .; an invasion of the rights of the injured
party, it is true .. .; but if not sanctioned in some way by the state,
or not done under state authority, his rights remain in force.86
(Emphasis added.)
The interpretation the Supreme Court did adopt in the Civil Rights Cases
was that of the minority which opposed the fourteenth amendment and op-
81 17 Stat. 13.
82 106 (16 Otto) U.S. 629 (1882).
83 18 Stat. 335.
84 2 CONG. Rac. 412 (1874).
85 Ibid.
86 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
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posed the legislation enacted to enforce its provisions. It is a fairly safe
assumption that whatever the amendment was intended to mean, it certainly
was not intended to mean that which its opponents said it meant.
B. Judicial History of State Non-Action
Oddly enough the judicial history of state non-action begins with two
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States who both wrote the
opinion for the majority in decisions which led up to the Civil Rights Cases -
Justice Woods and Justice Strong. 87 Justice Woods also has the dubious honor
of having voted with the majority in this last-mentioned decision.
Justice Strong was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1870 and re-
signed in 1880.88 Assigned to the Third Circuit, in 1873 he wrote in United
States v. Given:89
[The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth] Amendments have left
nothing to the comity of the states affecting the subject of their pro-
visions. They manifestly intended to secure the right guaranteed by
them against any infringement from any quarter. Not only were the
rights given - the right of liberty, the right of citizenship, and the right
to participate with others in voting ... but power was expressly con-
ferred upon congress to enforce the articles conferring .the rights.90
(Emphasis added.)
Given involved a refusal by a state official to collect poll taxes from Negroes.
No sanction existed under state law for this refusal. In upholding the in-
dictment of the state official for infringing rights under the fifteenth amend-
ment, Justice Strong said:
It is, I think, an exploded heresy that the national government cannot
reach all individuals in the states .... But when state laws have im-
posed duties upon persons, whether officers or not, the performance or
non-performance of which affects rights under the federal government,
... I have no doubt that Congress may make the non-performance of
those duties an offense against the United States, and may punish it
accordingly .... Undoubtedly, an act or an omission to act may be an
offense both against the state law and the laws of the United States.
Any other doctrine would place the national government entirely within
the power of the states and would leave constitutional rights guarded
only by the protection which each state might choose to extend
to them.91 (Emphasis added.)
87 Justice Woods wrote the opinion in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 629 (1882).
Justice Strong wrote the opinions in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1879); Virinia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 313 (1879).
88 Biographical Notes, 30 Fed. Cas. 1396 (1897). Upon Justice Strong's resignation in 1880,
popular opinion demanded that the "proper South" be represented on the Court. Accordingly,
Justice Woods---"an ardent Republican," native of Ohio and former Union general who participated
in Sherman's march to the sea - was appointed. 20 MALONE, DIcrTioNARY oF AmaucAN BioonsPHY
505-06 (1936).
89 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15,210) (C.C.D. Del. 1873).
90 25 Fed. Cas. 1324, 1326 (No. 15,210)(C.C.D. Del. 1873).
91 Id. at 1328. See also opinion of Bradford, J. in the same case, 25 Fed. Cas. 1328, 1329 (No.
15,211)(C.C.D. Del. 1873):
If by indifference, refusal to pass such laws as harmonize with and aid in making
available and secure to all citizens the right to vote, and by neglecting to punish
the officers of its own state for a violation of their duty in affording to the citizens
the prerequisites to voting, a practical denial and abridgement of that right are
effected, congress, in my judgement, has full power under the fifteenth amendment to
remove this evil, and to select such means as it may deem appropriate legislation.
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Seven years later in Ex parte Virginia,92 Justice Strong wrote:
We have said the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment are addressed
to the States. They are: "No State shall make or enforce a law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." They have reference to actions of the political
body denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever
modes that action may be taken. A state acts by its legislative, its
executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The
constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the
the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.93
Justice Strong, by his dictum in Ex parte Virginia, indicating that the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are limited to the positive acts of
state officials, is ready to close the concept of the rights protected by that
amendment, and to leave to the comity of the states the corrections of private
injustices of one group of citizens to another. Despite his opinion in Given
as to the meaning of the amendments, the states are to be allowed to
choose whether or not they will act in any given area to secure individual
rights, and until they do, there are no constitutional rights in its citizens.
Thus, Congress is denied the power to overcome state non-action, a power
it apparently had when United States v. Given was decided.
Justice Woods was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1880 after having
served as a judge in the Fifth Circuit for eleven years.94 While a circuit judge
in 1871 he wrote in United States v. Hall,95 to the effect that the fourteenth
amendment prohibited state non-action as well as state action. The defendants,
private individuals, had been indicted for violating Section Six of the Civil
Rights Act of 187096 by conspiring and banding together with intent to
hinder the complainants in their exercise of their right of freedom of speech
and peaceful assemblage. After holding that these rights were privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, 97 Judge Woods wrote:
We find that congress is forbidden to impair [freedom of speech and
assemblage] by the first amendment, and the states are forbidden to im-
92 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1879).
93 Id. at 346-47.
94 Biographical Notes, 30 Fed. Cas. 1403 (1897).
95 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15,282)(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). In this decision Judge Woods held that
"the right of freedom of speech, and the other rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States .. ." Id. at 82. Mr. Fairman, in finding that amendments I-VIII are not the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, makes no mention of this decision, but maintains
that "if the theory that the new privileges and immunities caluse incorporated amendments I-VIII
found no recognition in the ... courts, it is not surprising that the contemporary Supreme Court
knew nothing of it either." Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 132 (1949). Mr. Justice Frankfurter recently said: "The relevant his-
torical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars. [Citing Fairman]. These
materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the [state legislatures] did not contemplate that
the Fourteenth Amendment was not a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments
making them applicable as explicit restrictions on the State." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124
(1959).
96 Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140. This section was the forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
97 Though such a view was rejected by the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872), these rights later became fundamental liberties of persons protected by
substantive due process. Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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pair them by the fourteenth amendment. Can they not, then, be said to
be completely secured? They are expressly recognized, and both con-
gress and the states are forbidden to abridge them. Before the fourteenth
amendment, congress could not impair them, but the states might.
Since the fourteenth amendment, the bulwarks about these rights have
been strengthened, and now the states are positively inhibited from im-
pairing or abridging them, and so far as the provisions of the organic
law can secure them they are completely and absolutely secured.
The next clause of the fourteenth amendment reads: "Nor shall any
state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Then follows an express grant of power to the federal
government .... From these provisions it follows clearly, as it seems
to us, that congress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to pro-
tect the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against
unfriendly and insufficient state legislation,98 for the fourteenth amend-
ment not only prohibits the making or enforcing of laws which shall
abridge the privileges of the citizen, but prohibits the states from deny-
ing to all persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. Denying includes inaction as well as action, and denying the
equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as well
as the omission to pass laws for protection. The citizen of the United
States is entitled to the enforcement of the laws for the protection of
his fundamental rights, as well as the enactment of such laws. There-
fore, to guard against the invasion of the citizen's fundamental rights,
and to insure their adequate protection, as well against state legislation
as state inaction, or incompetency, the amendment gives congress the
power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. And as it
would be unseemly for congress to interfere directly with state enact-
ments, and as it cannot compel the activity of state officials, the only
appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate directly
on offenders and offenses, and protect the rights which the amendment
secures. The extent to which congress shall exercise this power must
depend on its discretion in view of the circumstance of each case.99
(Emphasis added.)
Eleven years later and then an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Woods in United States v. Harris'00 wrote:
The purpose and effect of... the Fourteenth Amendment.. .were
clearly defined by Mr. Justice Bradley in the case of United- States
States v. Cruikshank ... as follows: "It is a guaranty of protection
the acts of the State government itself. It is a guaranty against the ex-
ertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of the government
and legislature of the State, not a guaranty against the commission of
individual offenses; and the power of Congress, whether express or
implied, to legislate for the enforcement of such a guaranty does not
extend to the passage of laws for the suppression of crime within the
states."'10
98 Thus, Congress could enact such laws as would prohibit all interference with the freedoms
of speech and assemblage whether by state or individuals. This is in accord with Crosskey's ex-
planation that the restriction on Congress to make no law abridging the freedoms of speech and
assemblage does not mean that Congress can make no law protecting those freedoms, such as a law
prohibiting the states or individuals from interfering with them. 2 CRossxnY, PoLrrcs AND THE CON-
STITUTION 1057 (1953). See text at footnotes 16-17 supra.
99 United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81-82 (No. 15,282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
100 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 629 (1882).
101 Id. at 638.
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ognized that "the equality of rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.
Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in
the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally
assumed by the States; and it still remains there."'1 6 What the fourteenth
amendment was intended to do was to make this affirmative duty of the states
to protect civil rights an enforceable one. The last clause of section one
provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." This clause is equivalent to the principle of
republicanism just stated - every republican government is ii duty bound to
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of equality of rights if it is within
its power to do so."' The last clause of section one does not read "nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal operation of the laws." The
word "protection" is used instead of the word "operation." Equal protection
includes, but is not limited to, equal operation. However, it seems that all
that present constitutional doctrine requires is equal operation of the laws.
But the word "protection" implies a positive duty to act and it is by reason of
this word as well as the principle of republicanism that the states are under an
enforceable duty to affirmatively secure civil rights.
Stated briefly, the argument interpreting the fourteenth amendment
as granting Congress the power to overcome state non-action is as follows:
The states are under a duty to make and enforce laws which provide an in-
dividual with an effective remedial process for interference with his civil
rights. The states violate this duty when, through non-action, they fail to
provide such a remedy. This failure is a denial of equal protection of the
laws.
In the Civil Rights Cases the Court, by holding that a state could only
violate the fourteenth amendment by positive action, precluded any argument
based on the failure of a state to act when under a duty to do so. The illogic
of holding that the states could only violate the fourteenth amendment by
positive action became readily apparent, however, as soon as the Court found
a particular duty upon the states. The development of the "separate but
equal" doctrine furnishes an illustration. A state is under no duty to provide
a law school, but when it does provide a law school solely for white students
and refuses a Negro admittance, it comes under a duty to provide equal
facilities for the Negro. Failure to provide him with equal facilities, while
at the same time refusing him admittance to the white school, became a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. 0 8
The next step for the courts was to find that whenever a state official
was under a particular duty to act for the protection of a right, and he failed
106 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 555 (1875).
107 Under international law, a foreign nation is injured "when a state, through its officers or
duly authorized agents, acts directly against the subject of a foreign state, in violation of interna-
tional law [or] when a state acts indirectly, by failing to secure adequate remedies to strangers
injured by individuals within their jurisdiction." DAvis, ELEmENTs oF INTrRNATiONA. LAW 95 (1900).
Thus while the duty to act affirmatively for the protection of rights is recognized in international law
it is not now recognized in our constitutional law.
108 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); cf. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
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It has been asserted that Justice Woods' decision in United States v.
Harris cannot be reconciled with his decision in United States v. Hall.10 2
However, the inconsistency is less apparent when Justice Woods in Harris
ceased quoting Justice Bradley and spoke in his own words:
When the State has been guilty of no violation of [the fourteenth
amendment's] provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law
abridging ... privileges or immunities ... ; when no one of its de-
partments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or denied to any person ... equal protection of
the law; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted
by its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by
its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all
persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon
Congress.'0 3 (Emphasis added.)
But what if on the contrary the laws of the state do not protect the rights
of all persons because the state refuses to enact laws which provide for a
remedy for interference with a particular right because it knows that only a
minority group which the majority wishes to discriminate against will avail
themselves of this remedy?
The portion of Justice Woods opinion in United States v. Hall quoted
previously 04 serves as an adequate statement of the argument in favor of
congressional power under the fourteenth amendment capable of overcoming
state non-action. The real thrust of this argument is that "the citizen of the
United States is entitled to the enactment of the laws for protection of his
fundamental rights, as well as the enforcement of such laws."' 5
The intention of the framers of the fourteenth amendment as set out
above and reflected in the lower court decisions of Justices Strong and
Woods, is that when a state fails to protect civil rights the federal government
may extend that protection. The logical assertion to be made against this
position is that the fourteenth amendment places no affirmative duty on
the states to act for the protection of civil rights. It is unnecessary for the
fourteenth amendment to place such a duty upon the states because it exists
notwithstanding the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has rec-
102 Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1940). In addition to the fact that the
Slaughter-House Cases were decided in the interim, two feasible explanations of this inconsistency
are available. First, that Justice Woods "better" grasped the intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment at the time of the decision in Harris. However, this is unlikely, in that having lived through
the period of ratification his conclusions on this point in Hall better express his own as distinguished
from the Court's opinion. Furthermore, in deciding Hall he was not faced with the policy con-
siderations which influenced the decision of the Supreme Court, particularly that of the Civil Rights
Cases where he voted with the majority. The second explanation is that in adopting the interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment that the Democratic minority had been continuously urging on Congress
(See FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 210-77(1908)), Justice Woods was
giving vent to his partisan political leanings which had been repressed during the Civil War and the
period of his lower court judgeship. Although Democratic speaker of the House of the General
Assembly of Ohio in 1857, minority leader of the Democrats two years later and "bitterly opposed to
President Lincoln," Justice Woods became an "ardent Republican" after the war, actively partici-
pating in the reconstruction government. Republican presidents appointed him first to the circuit
court of appeals and then to the Supreme Court. 20 MALONE, DICTIONARY or AMERcIAN BrooRAHY
505-06 (1936).
103 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 629, 639 (1882).
104 Text at notes 95-97 supra.
105 United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81(No. 15,282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
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to act, this also would constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Three circuit court decisions illustrate this development of the law.
In Catlette v. United States,10 9 a police officer was under a duty to
protect people from mob violence. He abandoned his duty and walked away,
allowing a mob to assault a group of Jehovah's Witnesses. In upholding his
conviction of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 52110 and ultimately the fourteenth
amendment, the court said:
It is true that a denial of equal protection has hitherto been largely
confined to affirmative acts of discrimination. The Supreme Court,
however, has already taken the position that culpable official state
inaction may also constitute a denial of equal protection."'
In Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R.,112 a justice of the peace was under
a duty to grant a hearing before a person was extradited from the state. He
refused to grant a hearing to the plaintiff. In deciding that the plaintiff had a
cause of action under the Federal Civil Rights Act 1 3 against the justice of the
peace, Judge Biggs wrote:
If these allegations be proved it may be concluded that the refusal of
the justice to act as required by law may have deprived the plaintiffs
of their liberty without due process of the law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.... The refusal of a state officer to perform
a duty imposed on him by the law of his state because he has conspired
with others in a conscious design to deprive a person of civil rights in
legal effect may be the equivalent of action taken "under the color"
of the law of the state.
114
In Lynch v. United States,"5 police officers were under a duty to protect
prisoners from mob violence. After arresting some Negroes, the police officers
made no effort to protect them from a Ku Klux Klan mob. In upholding
their conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952), the court held:
There was a time when the denial of equal protection of the laws
was confined to affirmative acts, but the law now is that culpable
official inaction may also constitute a denial of equal protection.
1 16
In light of the judicial development since the Civil Rights Cases, the
following general principle may be stated. When a state is under a duty to
act to protect the rights of an individual, but fails to do so, the individual
has been denied equal protection of the laws.
The duty of the states to act positively to protect the fundamental
rights of all individuals has already been recognized. 117 The failure of the
states by. non-action to protect these rights is a violation of this duty, and in
accord with the principle just stated, should be a denial of equal protection
of the laws. By reason of section five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress
109 132 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1951).
110 The former version of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
111 Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
112 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
113 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952). See the debates in
Congress when this law was enacted, Text at notes 72-78, supra, which supports the reasoning of
Judge Biggs.
114 Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776
(1947).
115 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951).
116 Id. at 479.
117 Text at note 106, supra.
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is empowered to enact whatever legislation is appropriate to enforce the pro-
hibition on the states not to deny anyone the equal protection of the laws.
Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases was correct in characterizing
the laws Congress may enact pursuant to section five as corrective legisla-
tion.118 He was incorrect, however, in asserting that in no situation could
such corrective legislation operate directly on individual action. Congress
should be able to provide an individual with a remedy against another in-
dividual for interfering with his civil rights when such legislation is also cor-
rective legislation.
Against state action, and by this is meant positive state acts, once Con-
gress implements the constitutional power of the federal judiciary with general
jurisdiction over constitutional questions, the prohibitions of section one
of the fourteenth amendment become self-executing on the federal level. By
providing such jurisdiction Congress has just about exhausted its power to
enact appropriate legislation to enforce the amendment against state action.
However, this may not provide an effective remedy in all cases where an
individual is deprived of his civil rights by reason of the acts of a state
official. For example, if a person is convicted of a crime through a confession
obtained by third-degree methods, the general jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary over constitutional questions provides him with an effective remedy
because he can obtain reversal of the conviction upon appeal. But, if a
person's civil rights are simply interfered with by the act of a state official and
no conviction of a crime results, the general jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary provides him no relief. To insure the person in this situation an
effective remedy, Congress may appropriately provide that such acts of the
state official constitute a crime and/or a tort, and also provide for preventive
relief upon the instigation of either the aggrieved person or the Attorney
General of the United States. The remedy of criminal prosecution and torl
liability should be discreetly granted according to requirements of wilfulness
and direct infringement. Thus it would be inappropriate for Congress to
provide such relief against legislators enacting laws in violation of the civil
rights of an individual, whereas it would be appropriate to provide such
relief against local police officers violating the civil rights of an individual.
State inaction is the failure of a state official of the executive or judicial
branches of government to act in a particular situation for the protection
of the rights of the individual when under a duty to do so under existing state
law. State inaction is the equivalent of state action, as was developed in
Catlette, Picking and Lynch. All legislation by Congress which would be ap-
propriate to enforce the fourteenth amendment against state action is also
appropriate against state inaction. But in some instances of state inaction
where the individual is harmed by other individuals, the only fully effective
remedy is not to grant a remedy against the state official alone, but also to
substitute a federal remedy against the individual, equivalent to the remedy he
has been denied by the inaction of the state official. For example, it might be
provided that where a state prosecutor has willfully failed to prosecute a
118 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883).
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criminal action, the complainant be allowed to instigate a suit in the federal
court similar to the one he has been denied in the state. Such appropriate
legislation would here be operating against individuals, but only through
the element of state inaction.
State non-action is the failure of the state legislature to provide effective
remedies against individuals who interfere with the civil rights of other in-
dividuals. Congress cannot compel state legislatures to enact laws. Thus, in
the face of state non-action, Congress is left no other course but to'provide
legislation which operates directly on offenders and offenses and provides
remedies the state legislature should have provided. Consequently, Congress
may provide that the interference of one individual with the rights of another
individual constitutes a crime and/or a tort and further provide for preventive
relief upon the instigation of the federal goverunment or the injured person.
Thus it is seen that the only appropriate congressional legislation corrective
of state non-action is that which was expressly prohibited by the Civil Rights
Cases - legislation operating on private individuals.
It must be remembered that Congress deals with fifty states and not
necessarily all will be guilty of non-action in regard to the particular right
Congress deems it necessary to protect by federal legislation. On this point
a complaint Justice Bradley voiced in the Civil Rights Cases against the
legislation therein involved is pertinent:
It applies equally in States which have the justest laws respecting
the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready
to enforce such laws, as those which arise in States that may have
violated the prohibitions of the amendment. 119
Appropriate congressional legislation against state non-action, therefore,
would be inapplicable in states not guilty of non-action. How this may be
accomplished is left to the skill of the draftsman, but some suggestions are
offered here. Presuming that freedom of speech is a civil right of an in-
dividual, and Congress deems it necessary to enact legislation to overcome
state non-action in regard to this right, legislation could be enacted by Con-
gress making it a crime for one individual to interfere with another in-
dividual's freedom of speech, conferring jurisdiction of the crime on the
courts of any state not having an adequate remedy of its own for such in-
terference. The state courts would make the initial determination as to
whether an adequate remedy existed under state law, and this determination
would be made subject to review by the Supreme Court. Failure through re-
fusal of the executive and judicial officials of the state government to enforce
the federal law or their own remedy would be state inaction. Congress could
provide that such action or inaction is a crime and/or a tort and provide
for adjudication in a federal court pursuant to their admitted power to
legislate against state action and inaction as developed above.
A more feasible suggestion would be legislation making it a crime for
an individual to interfere with another individual's freedom of speech, con-
ferring jurisdiction of the crime on the federal courts when no adequate
119 Id. at 14.
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remedy for such interference exists under state law. Here a federal court
would determine the question of the adequacy of the state remedy, including
its effectiveness. If an effective remedy exists, the federal courts would have
no jurisdiction and the complainant would have to pursue his state remedy.
The refusal of the state prosecutor to initiate state proceedings would con-
stitute state inaction and Congress could provide a federal remedy against
the prosecutor in such a situation.
At the present time the power in Congress to enact all the legislation
deemed appropriate against state action, and to some degree against inaction,
exists. Congressional power to enact effective legislation against inaction and
individual interference with civil rights remains to be recognized. It is main-
tained that Congress has this power to overcome state non-action by reason
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This is seen from
the meaning of this clause as understood by the framers when they enacted
enforcement legislation, from circuit court decisions prior to the Civil Rights
Cases, from judicial developments subsequent to the Civil Rights Cases, and
from the plain meaning of the words "deny" and "protection" as used in the
amendment.
The legislation which would be appropriate for Congress to enact against
state non-action is commensurate with the principles of federalism. Any state
may retain its sovereignty over any civil right and completely exclude the
federal remedy for interference with that right by simply providing an ad-
equate and effective remedy of its own.12-
Such an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment would result in an
effective system commensurate with our dual sovereignty form of government
for the protection of any right predetermined a civil right. This then leaves us
with the definitional problem, which was avoided at the beginning of this
article and to which we can only allude" at this point. Civil rights of the in-
dividual could be characterized as the "unalienable rights" of the Declaration
of Independence, the "inalienable rights of the people" of the North Carolina
Convention of 1788,121 and the "great rights of mankind" developed in
Madison's Speech to Congress in 1789.122 More particularly, the civil rights
of an individual are at least those minimum protections mentioned in Amend-
ments I-VIII of the Constitution.
Cnclusion
That the individual is endowed with fundamental rights was generally
recognized at the beginning of our history as an independent nation. That
governments are instituted among men to secure these rights was proclaimed
to mankind. The federal and state governments were instituted for this pur-
pose. These governments, whether before or after the forming of a more per-
fect Union were not considered as creating these fundamental rights or dis-
120 For an example of a state providing at least some remedy for interference with a civil right,
see Lebel v. Swincicki, 93 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. 1958).
121 Convention of North Carolina, Declaration of Rights (1788), THE FDEPRALIST 646 (Ford ed.
1898).
122 SMrrH AND MURPHY, LmERaT AND JUSTICE 181 (1958).
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tributing them as a majority of the people might see fit. Until Barron v. Balti-
more was decided, it was still possible to hope that the fundamental rights of
mankind were secure by process of law from oppression throughout the length
and breadth of the the United States. Barron v. Baltimore made the protection
of fundamental rights solely a matter of process of law in each state unless the
federal government itself was oppressive. Oppressive laws of certain states led
to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, which by its terms re-instated
the securing of fundamental human rights thoughout the United States and
authorized congressional legislation to carry out its great purposes. As has
been shown, the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases nullified the
significance of the priviliges and immunities clause of the amendment and in
the Civil Rights Cases further restricted the scope of Congressional action.
The scrutiny of these cases previously made in this article has, it is submitted,
indicated that the limitations on the national protection of fundamental rights
need not in the future prevail when Congress has under consideration what
has come to be known as civil rights legislation. This consideration is fortified
by the demands now made in many quarters that the fundamental rights of
the individual must receive protection not only at the national level but even
in international law.
